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Warfare without damage has always been a dream of military planners.  Traditional warfare usually leaves persistent side
effects in the form of dead and injured people and damaged infrastructure.  An appealing feature of cyberwarfare is that it
could be more ethical than traditional warfare because its damage could be less and more easily repairable.  Damage to
data and programs (albeit not physical hardware) can be repaired by rewriting over damaged bits with correct data. 
However, there are practical difficulties in ensuring that cyberattacks minimize unreversible collateral damage while still
being easily repairable by the attacker and not by the victim.  We discuss four techniques by which cyberattacks can be
potentially reversible.  One technique is reversible cryptography, where the attacker encrypts data or programs to prevent
their use, then decrypts them after hostilities have ceased.  A second technique is to obfuscate the victim's computer
systems in a reversible way.  A third technique to withhold key data from the victim, while caching it to enable quick
restoration on cessation of hostilities.  A fourth technique is to deceive the victim so that think they mistakenly think they
are being hurt, then reveal the deception at the conclusion of hostilities.  We also discuss incentives to use reversible
attacks such as legality, better proportionality, lower reparations, and easier ability to use third parties.  As an example, we
discuss aspects of the recent cyberattacks on Georgia.
 
This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, July 2010,
Thessaloniki, Greece.
 




The U.S. military is concerned about defending against cyberattacks. Little progress has been made in the last few years
in this defense, due to increasing dependence on networking and the spread of unnecessarily complex software products. 
Attackers have grown increasingly sophisticated, and are now predominantly members of large organized groups, either
organized crime or government espionage.  Militaries are increasingly wondering to what extent these cyberattack
techniques could be used as nonlethal weapons (Rattray, 2001).
 
An emerging consensus is that many existing "laws of war" do apply to cyberconflict (Schmitt, 2002).  This includes the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977 (ICRC, 2007).  Article 51 of the 1977
Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks that employ methods and means of combat whose
effects cannot be controlled or whose damage to civilians is disproportionate, and Article 57 says “Constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects”.  So it is important to ensure this with cyberweapons.
 
These laws matter because of the practical difficulties in using cyberattacks effectively in warfare.  As we have discussed
elsewhere (Rowe, 2010), cyberattacks are less reliable than conventional attacks because they exploit bugs and flaws in
software, and bugs and flaws are constantly being fixed.  Cyberattacks thus tend to be unnecessarily strong in an effort to
ensure their success.  This risks high collateral damage.  The good news is that some cyberattacks are better than others
in that the damage they cause is more easily reversible.  Lack of reversibility is an important argument for banning
weapons, as with the recent initiatives to ban land mines in warfare.  This suggests we draw analogies to outlaw
irreversible cyberattacks in international law and treaties.
 
1.1 The Georgia attacks 
 
The cyberattacks on Georgia in August 2008 suggest a possible future of cyberwarfare; (USCCU, 2009) provides an
excellent summary.  Attacks were launched to coincide with a military invasion of Georgia by Russia (the "South Ossetia
War"), and appeared to be well planned and timed (Markoff, 2008).  They primarily involved denial of service against key
Georgia Web sites, with some malware involved in support of this, plus some Web-site defacement.  Some of attacking
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sites were known malware sites, some were new sites created specifically for the attack, some were "botnets" of otherwise
innocent computers, and some were computers of people recruited to attack from social-networking sites.  None of these
were government or military sites.
 
The targets of the attack were government and business organizations in Georgia that contributed to its ability to withstand
the conventional military attack which followed shortly thereafter.  They included government agencies associated with
communications as well as news-media organizations, apparently with the goal of making it difficult for Georgians to
determine what was happening.  Later attacks broadened the scope to financial and educational institutions, as well as
businesses associated with particular kinds of infrastructure.  These cyberattacks were clearly targeted at civilians, and
were targeted quite precisely.  A wide range of techniques were used in generally nonattributable ways in a well planned
campaign.  Apparently the attacks were designed (unlike the attacks on Estonia previously) to avoid international outcry.
 
Attacking primarily civilian enterprises is a clear violation of the laws of war (Walzer, 1977).  Civilians are not supposed to
be the primary targets of military actions unless they are substantially contributing to a tactical or strategic military asset. 
Civilian communications and media outlets are not military assets, and in fact can be adversarial to the military.  This is
different from the bombing of munitions plants during World War II, where the munitions were directly contributing to the
war effort.  So since the Georgia attacks were clearly correlated to a subsequent military incursion, they were clearly a
violation of the laws of war.  It is likely that the reason that military sites were not attacked was that they were better
hardened against attack, so attacking them would be less cost-effective.
 
Denial of service and Web site defacement are relatively benign forms of attack compared to other possible cyberattacks. 
Once the attacks stopped, repair of sites was relatively straightforward; on this the attacks were relatively ethical. 
However, they still were not ethical.  The government of Georgia could not inform citizens of what to do during the attack,
and its ability to provide government services, medical services, and humanitarian activities then was greatly impeded. 
Some of the damage was permanent because of lost opportunities during the denial of service.
 
2 The damage of a cyberattack
 
Let us consider the main factors that affect the damage of a cyberattack.  Cyberattacks can range from limited and
controlled tactical attacks to broad and uncontrolled campaigns.  This means their legal and ethical issues can vary
considerably as well.
 
Collateral damage is a major factor in evaluating cyberattacks.  This can cause needless suffering even if no one is killed. 
Concerns of this kind have limited U.S cyberattacks in the past (Markoff and Shanker, 2009).  Collateral damage can be
minimized by precise targeting.  Such precision may not always be possible.  Sites can change their names or shift (as in
the case of Georgia) to another country, and self-propagating malware such as viruses and worms can autonomously
spread beyond the initial targets.
 
An important difficulty with cyberattacks is in localizing them, something much more difficult than with conventional military
attacks.  This makes their effects difficult to repair.  Computer systems and networks are complex.  When something
malfunctions, it may be difficult find the part of it that is responsible.  Cyberattacks in particular will pick unusual targets
within systems and do surprising things to them to obtain the maximum effect.  Debugging of computer systems and
networks is difficult, and many operators of computer systems lack detailed understanding of what they are running.  The
Georgia cyberattacks were focused primarily on the input to Web sites, which simplified their localization.  But these
attacks were clearly intended to be demonstrations.  Most attacks will not be as easy to localize.
 
Another important factor in evaluating damage is its reversibility, the focus of this paper.  If an attack can be quickly
undone, this can be used to remove collateral damage, and it permits quick repair after the cessation of hostilities.  It also
helps achieve proportional response, a key aspect of the laws of war for counterattacks (Darnton, 2006), since an
inadvertently too-powerful attack can be partially undone.  Some proponents of cyberwarfare claim it is more reversible
than other forms of warfare (Shulman, 1999), since damage to programs and data can be repaired by copying the original
data over the damaged data.  However, restoring programs and data by the victim can be time-consuming and requires
well-trained staff (Dorf and Johnson, 2007) which is not always available.  Cyberattacks also usually create psychological
as well as physical effects, and psychological damage to a victim may not be easy to reverse.  Also, attacks on time-
critical activities may not be reversible.  When a patient in a hospital is on a respirator controlled by a computer and the
computer delays actions, the patient can die.  Similarly, delaying many important activities of a government, and
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particularly a military, can cause plenty of damage.  Nonetheless, using attacks that are mostly reversible is a step in the
right direction towards the responsible conduct of cyberwarfare.
 
3 Techniques for reversible cyberattacks
 
Let us consider ways to enable cyberattack damage to be reversed by an attacker more quickly and better than by
restoring from backup.  These cyberattacks could be traditional outsider-based attacks from the Internet during which the
attacker sends malicious packets to a victim that enable them to take over control of the victim's computer, or they could
be attacks accomplished by a malicious insider.  Note however that cyberattacks are crimes in most countries, as they




Cryptography is a systematic method for concealing information (Mel and Baker, 2000).  Since information superiority is a
key objective of warfare, concealing it can be an attack (Libicki, 2007).  Then the attack could be repaired by restoring
availability of the information.
 
An example would be encrypting key programs of a victim with a decryption key that only the attacker knows.  Encrypted
programs would be unusable by the victim until the attacker is willing to decrypt them.  Valuable data such as sensor
information can also be encrypted by an attack.  Encryption can be accomplished by obtaining administrator ("root")
access to a machine by any of a number of methods, and making changes to software and data.  Such access can be
obtained long in advance and then an attack can be triggered by an external signal.  Rather than encrypting an entire
piece of software, a simpler alternative is to insert a prolog or "wrapper" to programs that requires a user to enter a
password known to the attacker before the program can be used.  This is easiest if a program already requires a
password, in which case the attacker could modify data to require the attacker's password instead.
 
Another alternative is to encrypt the data going to a victim, as discussed in section 3.3.  Data is usually more vulnerable to
modification than programs.  Many secure networks encrypt their data in transmission, and this could be changed to use
the attacker's key rather than the victim's.  This could be done with administrator access to the machines doing the
encryption, usually just the first and final ones through which the data passes (with "end-to-end encryption"), and could be
accomplished by "rootkits" (Kuhnhauser, 2004).  It could also be accomplished by modifying the hardware used for
networking, replacing parts or whole computer systems with those designed by the attacker.
 
The main countermeasure for encryption-based attacks is restoration of the damaged code from backup.  However, it may
be difficult to determine what to restore because of the attack localization problem discussed above.  Even when the
attack can be localized, restoration can be difficult when properly trained personnel are unavailable, personnel are
unfamiliar with the restoration procedure, or the restoration procedure is complicated (as it can be with complex software
like operating systems).  Restoration requires valuable time of system administrators that they did not anticipate using,
and it might not be fast enough in a "blitzkrieg" cyberattack designed to quickly achieve objectives.
 
Encryption-based attacks could be easy to detect, since encrypted characters have statistical randomness very different
from those of normal programs and software.  Attackers who want their attacks to be visible to encourage negotiation




Computer systems are carefully designed entities.  If we can disrupt their organization, they become unusable.  So a class
of "obfuscating" attacks could rearrange the software and data of a computer system, or map data values to new values in
a one-to-one mapping, or insert extra data, in a way known only to the attacker.  For instance, we could interchange parts
of programs; we could add 13 modulo 256 to a set of designated 8-bit bytes; or we could insert random bytes into
designated locations in programs.  The plan for how we obfuscate can be arbitrarily elaborate if we record it carefully. 
Cryptographic methods are a special case of obfuscating methods, but the restrictions of cryptography are not necessary
to make a system unusable.  For instance, adding many random bytes could greatly increase the size of programs,
something cryptographic methods do not do in their attempt to be space-efficient, but which works well as an attack
technique given the typically small portion of occupied storage on most computer systems.
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Anything can be targeted with obfuscation techniques, but the obfuscation can be more efficient if it targets critical parts of
programs and key data.  If the attacker wants their attack to be noticed, they can target highly visible parts such as the
user interface.  Just modifying the appearance of a window can make software ususable with little effort.
 
Obfuscating attacks can be undone by applying the reverse of the attacking actions in reverse order.  So for instance if we
interchanged two blocks of code, added 13 to each byte, and then added two bytes of "37" on the end, we can undo the
effects by deleting the two end bytes, subtracting 13 from each byte, and then interchanging the same two blocks.  Any
operation performing a one-to-one mapping (an "isomorphism") on either the contents or location of data can be reversed
by an inverse operation.  This includes operations that add useless information since they effectively permute locations of
the real information.
 
If the rearrangement is sufficiently complex, it would be virtually impossible for the victim to figure it out and reverse it,
although unlike encryption, it could be reversed given sufficient time.  Unlike encryption, obfuscation with interchanges and
padding can be designed to provide the same statistics as the original system, and thus be difficult to localize.  More than
encryption, restoration from backup would be difficult and slow because the entire system would need to be restored if the
modifications were well dispersed and the victim could not recognize them.  Partial restoration could be worse than none





Another potentially reversible attack method directly withholds data.  This is similar to blockading in traditional naval
warfare and jamming in electronic warfare, both of which share the advantage of relatively reversible damage.  Denial of
service is an example of indirect denial of data by flooding a resource with false data so there is little time to process the
true data.  But denial of service is a relatively broad attack which risks much collateral damage.
 
A more precise way to withhold information is to use a "man in the middle" deployment: The attacker inserts their own
hardware and/or software (perhaps by address hijacking) between the victim and the victim's intended communicants, or
takes control of an existing machine on that route.  Only information that the attacker allows will then pass from or to the
victim.  This could be accomplished by encrypting the information as suggested in the last section, so the victim gets or
sends all their normal volume of data but no one can read it.  Alternatively, if the volume of data is not large, it could be
withheld from the victim and saved for restoration after the cessation of hostilities.  Returning the data repairs some
damage, since getting it late is usually better than not getting it at all, and facilitates tracking of secondary damage caused
by the withholding.  However, this will not reverse all damage, like physical damage from the failure of a computer system
to prevent a subsequent irreversible physical attack.
 
If the "middleware" doing the diversion is designed to be highly selective, bandwidth may not be a problem.  For instance,
an attack on a sensor system might withhold only locations, which are easy to spot in text because they use standard
formats.  Or it might block the locations of attacker military units while reporting locations of casualties to permit Red Cross
activities.  Or a messaging system might only block orders down the chain of command, not reports going up, preventing
the application of force while keeping the victim informed of what is happening.  Man-in-the-middle deployments can be
done with hardware, as by inserting a new device on the Internet connection to a computer.  Or they can be done with
software, by modifying the implementation of Internet protocols with the assistance of a rootkit.
 
An alternative way to withhold information is to misroute it.  So a man-in-the-middle attack could deliberately change
destination headers of Internet packets sent through it to that of a site it controls.  If the corresponding correct destinations
are stored somewhere, and the packets are stored at the new destination, the attack could be reversed.  This has the
advantage of eliminating storage at the man-in-the-middle device.
 
A countermeasure for man-in-the-middle attacks is to bypass the middle, much as blockaded countries can find new
routes to conduct trade.  Attackers can prevent this by attacking a "bottleneck" computer such as a server for a local-area
network, or by exploiting key protocols for networking that must be used by a user.  Firewall and intrusion-prevention
computers, and TCP and HTTP protocols, provide good opportunities for such attacks.  Almost as good are file and Web
servers for a local-area network.
 
3.4 Resource-deception attacks
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Another approach is to deceive a victim with illusory damage.  Then "repairing" the attack means just revealing the truth to
the victim.  A simple way is to modify the victim's operating system to issue false error messages on any attempts to use
the system for something important (Rowe, 2007).  Most users take error messages seriously, so false error messages
can be quite disruptive to them.  Such messages raise no legal problems themselves, unlike man-in-the-middle attacks,
since they happen not infrequently when the software lacks sufficient information to accurately diagnose an error. 
However, the necessary modification of the operating system is still a form of vandalism.
 
Resource deception can be implemented by modifying the operating system of a computer by a rootkit.  One good way is
through "software wrappers" on key components of the operating system and applications software (Michael et al, 2002). 
Normally the wrappers can behave transparently, passing on commands to the operating system and passing back
responses.  But in specified circumstances recognized by a system monitor, the wrappers can issue false error messages
and other confusing information.  Alternatively, hardware exceptions can be triggered by the wrappers, which can simulate
serious errors.
 
Error messages can be made more persuasive using techniques from spam and phishing (Spammer X, 2004).  Official-
looking graphics and verbal manipulation can be used.  Claims of authorization from authorities and experts, rewards for
compliance, and threats for noncompliance can be cited.  Creating an atmosphere of urgency will also help, e.g. flashing
red letters saying "Security Violation -- Log out now."  However, persuasion works less well when it coincides too closely
with the attack, since an intelligent victim will likely infer a common cause.  It would be better to begin deception well
before the attack.  Also, repeated deceptions lose effectiveness as the victim becomes familiar with them, so deceptions
should only be used occasionally.
 
A countermeasure to resource deception is to reinstall the software generating it.  But this is time-consuming.  It may also
be unnecessary because a clever adversary could modify an operating system in superficial ways that do not require
reinstallation.
 
While automated deceptions do not damage data and programs to the extent of the previously mentioned attacks, they do
create persistent damage in the form of increased distrust of computer systems by the victim.  This can unfairly reduce
their ability to use computer technology for a long time, and these effects can extend to a broad range.  Trust is built up
slowly, but distrust can increase quickly given a single act (Ford, 1996).  Thus deception-based attacks may need to be
used cautiously.
 
4 Additional factors contributing to reversibility
 
Not all cyberattacks following the above methods will be equally feasible or equally reversible.  Other considerations are
involved.
 
Methods for reversible attacks need precision in targeting to simplify their reversal as well as reduce their chances of
collateral damage and disproportionality in attacking.  Precision enables an attacker to focus on a few well-chosen military
targets and better assess the effect of their attack.  If the effect is too small, the attack can be increased; if the effect is too
large, reversing the attack can be done even before hostilities cease.
 
Reversibility may decrease with time.  For instance, a victim may close its Internet connections so that systems cannot be
reached to repair them.  Or an attack may be detected by the victim and repaired ineptly to make reversing impossible, as
by loading the wrong backup copies resulting in incompatible software modules that will not work.  These contingencies
need to be addressed in attack planning.  Reversal may also have a latency (time delay) that causes additional harm.  For
instance, if Georgia had surrendered midway during the campaign against it, it is unlikely that the attacks would have
stopped for quite a while, since they were coordinated primarily at the planning stage and not during execution.  Then
Georgia would have incurred considerable damage after surrendering, a clear violation of the laws of war.
 
Another important factor is the ability of the defender to identify the attacker ("attribution").  It is desirable that the victim
know this for a reversible attack since the attacker knows best how to reverse it.  After all, anonymous attacks are typical
of terrorism; a responsible country wants their attacks to be attributable to help achieve precise outcomes.  A simple form
of attribution is to consistently use a well-known source site.  (Otherwise, just leaving the sites up for a while after the
attack will aid tracing of their location.)  More generally, an attacker can attach crytographic signatures to the attack code
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or data. Signatures can be embedded in unnecessary instructions in code or in comments in data; steganography
(Wayner, 2002) can be used to conceal the signatures if necessary.  Signatures can use the private key of a public-private
key pair so that only the attacker can attach them.
 
5 Enforcement of reversible attacks
 
A question is what incentive a cyberattacker has to use reversible attack methods.  A similar question can be asked about
many other military technologies, such as conventional weapons instead of  nuclear weapons.  Some incentives in these
cases come from international outcry at using unethical methods and the resulting ostracism of the offending state or
organization.  But more importantly, nations agree to laws of warfare, and unethical methods can violate those laws. 
Responses of the international community to such violations include sanctions, boycotts, fines, and legal proceedings
(Berman, 2002).
 
A good incentive for reversible attacks occurs if the attacker must pay to repair the damage.  Estimates of repair costs
could be an important factor in the amount of reparations required to settle a conflict (Torpey, 2006).  Reparations are also
enforceable against non-state actors such as factions within a country.  If a neutral party can enforce reparations,
reversible attacks are advantageous to belligerents.  The reversal methods proposed here can be initiated remotely, so
territorial-integrity concerns that impede cleanup of damage of conventional warfare are less burdensome with
cyberweapons.  A related issue is the attacker proving that they have removed all traces of their attack, which is not
difficult to do for the relatively simple attack techniques of this paper.  For instance, an attacker that used signatures can
prove that none remain on a system.
 
Another incentive to reversible attacks is if a victim is likely to respond in like kind.  Then use of reversible attack could
encourage an adversary to do the same because otherwise they would appear to be escalating the conflict (Gardam,
2004).
 
Cryptographic attacks can exploit three-party cryptographic protocols such as key escrow (Mel and Baker, 2000).  In this,
a neutral third party holds a key for deciphering an attack's encryption scheme.  Similarly, in obfuscating attacks the "swap
plan" functions like a key and could be held by the third party.  A neutral third party like the United Nations could confirm
signatures of attacks and assess damage, which could be more acceptable to the belligerents when done by a
disinterested party.
 
A neutral third party could also provide selective or staged repair of reversible cyberweapon damage for belligerents that
do not trust one another.  The third party could alternate repair between two countries in stages so that none ever has a
significant repair advantage over the other.  A third party could try to calm crises by enforcing limited sanctions on the
belligerents using the methods described above, that would allow food, medicine, and other forms of humanitarian
assistance to be arranged across the Internet, while prohibiting activities that led to the conflict such as denial-of-service
actions by either party to the conflict.  Going further, a third party such as the United Nations could even employ reversible
attacks themselves as a form of humanitarian intervention in a conflict to stop it, as for instance for a genocide.  Reversible




All warfare aims at precise effects on its victims.  Reversibility of attacks aids and supports precision.   We have discussed
four ways for implementing reversible cyberattacks, and some of the secondary factors that affect their reversibility. 
Reversible cyberattacks are clearly feasible, cost-effective, and some can be made undetectable.  Thus reversibility
appears to be a desirable property of cyberweapons.
 
An issue is whether the availability of reversible cyberattacks will encourage attacks.  Reversibility, even if partial and
delayed, lowers the cost to the attacker as broadly measured.  However, any kind of attack introduces risks for the
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